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Northern Sea Route: Chokepoint Contingency

Unanticipated incidents restricting or blocking the world’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) at chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, Bab

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Unanticipated incidents restricting or blocking the world’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) at chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, and others in the greater Southeast Asia region would create demand for an alternate route east.  Ramifications of possible scenarios must be evaluated in order for contingency plans to be made.

Closure or restricted access of these chokepoints, which see over half of the world’s thru-traffic, could more than triple freight rates due to jumps in insurance premiums and increased fuel expenses. In such a situation, Russia can offer the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a substitute for expensive and protracted detours around the Cape of Good Hope and/or Australia. Having options and alternatives is a principal canon of resilient systems, especially in transport logistics. Hence, developing the NSR as a viable contingency connection to Asia may prove to be a godsend in the future.

The NSR is not yet ready to accommodate general increases in shipping, yet alone handle a thru-traffic surge in a contingency situation. Its shortcomings— high operating costs, a brief ice-free season, and hazardous sailing conditions— make it unattractive to commercial operators, and therefore does not perpetuate further investment. Experts indicate that to boost its appeal Russia must lower icebreaking escort expenses, class inspection and permit filing fees, as well as pilotage costs. While this is certainly true, it is only significant when evaluating the NSR’s cost effectiveness in the current unimpeded SLOC paradigm. In the event of disruption of global SLOCs, the financial concerns over NSR shipping would be rendered insignificant, as it may be the only realistic Europe-Asia route leaving maintenance and reliability as the sole factors that limit Russia’s ability to satisfy increased demand.

Russia is aware that these shortcomings are keystones to the NSR’s rise as an attractive SLOC and contingency artery. Despite government spending, NSR maintenance and development projects have been slow to take off. Domestic politics and budgeting setbacks coupled with delays in ice-class shipbuilding have retarded the already slow pace of much needed arctic development.  Insufficient icebreaking capabilities and search-and-rescue services are presently unprepared for grave accidents along the route. Should these capabilities be bolstered, the NSR will be able to accommodate safe and secure year-round navigation.

Developing and maintaining the NSR as a viable East-West passageway is not only in Russia’s interest, but in the interest of all countries dependent on the world’s main SLOCs. Contingency plans must be composed multi-laterally and implemented to ensure continuation of East-West traffic in the event of a chokepoint closure. Further development of the NSR and related maintenance capabilities are not only necessary to increase thru-traffic today, but to be prepared for the uncertainties of tomorrow.

Just as piracy risks and concerns of political instability off the Horn of Africa and greater Indo-Pacific region have led to joint-multinational and private sector cooperation, it may be reasonable to consider similar opportunities for such collaborative engagement in the Arctic. Countries with vested interest in the region and/or dependence on the other aforementioned SLOCs may find reason assist Russia in developing and maintaining the reliability of the NSR. Joint-multilateral investment in port and infrastructure projects, along with cooperation in icebreaking and search-and-rescue services, could be the key to unlocking the NSR’s commercial and contingency potential.

Joint multi-national military engagements in the Arctic such as Exercise Northern Eagle, have already brought together Russian, Norwegian, and American forces for cooperative search and rescue, anti-piracy, and counter-terrorism drills. Such combined activities can be a template for civil arctic collaboration to mitigate the geodynamic, environmental, and operational risks, as well as general icebreaking and maintenance of the NSR for year-round use and potential contingency scenarios.

Global shipping is internationalist in nature; as everyone benefits from SLOC stability, there are no sides to be taken. Recalling historical projects like construction of the Panama and Suez Canals, it is evident that multi-national cooperative efforts in SLOC development have yielded positive results for the industry and world as a whole. Regional arctic states and relevant international counterparts along with industry leaders should seize this opportunity to collaborate on NSR development for the common benefit of all.